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Abstract
In this paper we document that married individuals face a lower unemployment rate than their
single counterparts. We refer to this phenomenon as the marriage unemployment gap. Despite
dramatic demographic changes in the labor market over the last decades, this gap has been
remarkably stable both for men and women. Using a flow-decomposition exercise, we assess
which transition probabilities (across labor force states) are behind this phenomenon: For men,
the main driver is the higher job losing probabilities faced by single workers. For females, the
participation margin also plays a crucial role.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, the U.S. economy has experienced two major changes: a secular decline in
the proportion of married individuals in the labor force and a dramatic increase in the employment
rate of women, especially married ones.1 Despite these changes, there exists a stable and sizable
difference between the unemployment rates of married and single workers.2 In this paper, we
document that married men face a lower unemployment rate than single ones throughout our
considered sample. For women, a similar gap emerges in the 1980s and remains stable since then.
We label the phenomenon of lower unemployment rate for married individuals as the marriage
unemployment gap.
We analyze monthly data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and compute labor market
stocks and worker flows between employment, unemployment, and non-participation by marital
status and gender. We adjust the data for time aggregation, misclassification biases, and the
different observable characteristics of married and single individuals. Using a similar decomposition
method as in Shimer (2012), we assess which of the transitions are more relevant in accounting for
the average unemployment rate differences between married and single individuals. We find that
for males, the higher employment-to-unemployment probability exhibited by single males is the
main determinant of the gap. For females, this transition is also important, but we find that the
participation margin also plays an important role.
This paper is related to different streams of the literature. Firstly, as in Shimer (2012), Elsby,
Hobijn, and Sahin (2015) and Choi, Janiak, and Villena-Roldan (2015), we assess the importance of
worker flows on labor market stocks. Secondly, this paper relates to the literature studying another
striking difference between labour market outcomes of married and single individuals, namely the
marriage wage premium (Antonovics and Town (2004) is one example of this literature). Finally,
our analysis aims to provide a rich set of stylized facts to the growing theoretical literature on
joint employment search, as studied by Albrecht, Anderson, and Vroman (2010), Ek and Holmlund
(2010), or Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012), among others.
1See Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005); Greenwood and Guner (2008), Attanasio, Low, and
Sa´nchez Marcos (2008), or Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) among many others.
2Throughout this paper, we define the married group as those workers who, in our dataset, claim to be married
and their spouse is present in the household at the time of the survey. In the single group, we pool never married,
separated, divorced, and widowed individuals.
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2 Data
We use the monthly files from the Current Population Survey (CPS) as our main data source. Since
survey respondents are followed for up to four consecutive months, we use a standard age/sex/race
linking procedure to obtain longitudinal information on individuals across months.3 We consider all
individuals aged 16 and above (our results are robust to different age restrictions) between January
of 1976 and December of 2013. From the data, we compute the proportion of individuals during each
month in three labor market states: employment (E), unemployment (U) and inactivity/out of the
labor force (O). We also compute monthly transition probabilities as the number of individuals who
transit from one state {E,U,O} in month t to a subsequent state {E,U,O} in month t+ 1, divided
by the total number of individuals in the original state. Since we are interested in differences by
marital states, we discard individuals who change marital status between any two months. Below,
we discuss further adjustments we perform on the data.
Controlling for observables. When comparing married and single individuals, some of the
differences in outcomes may be attributed to differences in the demographic composition of each
group. In order to control for these, we adjust our sample using a matching algorithm:4 we
create bins for observable characteristics (gender, race, age, geographic location, education, and
the number of children in the household), then, we eliminate bins that contain individuals from
only one marital status. We iterate over the coarseness of variable definitions (e.g., precision of
education levels or race categories) in the previous step, such that we do not eliminate more than 5%
of the sample in this elimination step. Finally, in each bin we perform a bootstrap-like replication
of observations at random, in order to equate the number of married and single individuals. In our
final sample, the demographic characteristics of the single and married group are exactly identical.
The benefit of this procedure is two-fold. First, it is entirely non-parametric, so it does not
impose any structure on the effect of observables on the variables of interest (transition probabilities
in our case). Second, it allows us to compute the level of all labour market outcomes we are
interested in controlling for the effect of observables. Note that any regression would only deliver
the difference between married and singles individuals for each variable of interest. In Section B of
the appendix, we show a comparison between our method and a Probit regression.
Time aggregation and classification errors. The use of the data in its raw format (stocks and
3See Shimer (2012) for a description of the methodology.
4See Angrist (1998) for details.
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transition probabilities) suffers from two well known issues: time aggregation bias and classification
errors. Time aggregation bias arises since we only observe individual information at fixed time
intervals (one month apart in the case of the CPS), and have no information of what occurs in the
meantime. For example, if we observe an individual who is unemployed in period t and then is
employed in period t + 1, we record an unemployment to employment (UE) transition. However,
intermediate transitions could have occurred during the weeks inside the month. For example, a
UE followed by EU and a final UE transition could be encompassed by the originally observed,
month-to-month UE transition. The two later transitions are missed by the flow construction
method.5 In this paper we follow Shimer (2012) and Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015) and correct
for this bias using an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition technique.
Classification errors, on the other hand, are related to erroneous codification and/or reporting
of labor market states in surveys as the CPS. Since the distinction of whether one is looking
for a job or not might be fuzzy at the individual level, erroneous classification of individuals as
unemployed instead of inactive (and vice-versa) might be significant. As noted by Abowd and
Zellner (1985) and Poterba and Summers (1986), transition probability estimates between U and
O can be especially affected by misclassification. In this paper, we are comparing unemployment
rates and labor market transitions for different sub-groups of the population, who have significantly
different levels of attachment to the labor force. Taking care of this classification error is thus crucial
to get a correct view of heterogeneity in unemployment rates and its sources. In what follows, we
apply a procedure suggested in Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015) which entails ”ironing” out cycles
between unemployment and inactivity. For this method, we make full use of the longitudinal aspect
of the CPS and merge four consecutive months of data for each worker (when possible). We then
recode “U” to “O” whenever the “U” state is deemed to be temporary and likely to be misclassified
(and vice versa). For example, an observed four-month individual employment history of the form
OUOO (a month out of the labor force, followed by a month unemployed, followed by two months
out of the labor force) is changed to OOOO. In the same way, we replace an observed UOUU
history with UUUU .6
5This was first noted by Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1986).
6See Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2015) for a complete list of employment histories subject to recoding.
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3 Stocks and Flows
Figures 1 and 2 show time series for the employment to population ratio E/(E + U + O) and the
unemployment rate U/(E + U), respectively. Both figures are based on our adjusted sample, and
are divided by gender and marital status.
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Figure 1: Employment rate by marital status (in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Corrected for classification
errors. Adjusted sample to control for observables (see main text). Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average.
All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate by marital status (in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Corrected for classification
errors. Adjusted sample to control for observables (see main text). Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average.
All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
The figures show that employment rates have been stable in our sample, except for married
females: they experience a sharp increase in employment rates from the start of our sample (1976) to
around the year 2000, time at which employment rates flatten for them. Note also that employment
rates are higher for married men compared to single males, while the opposite is true for females.
Finally, employment loses are stronger for males (of both marital states) during recessions, shown
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in the figures as grey vertical bars, which represent National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
recession dates.
As for unemployment rates, both genders exhibit higher rates when one considers the single
sample as opposed to the married one. This is the marriage unemployment gap. The average gap
(rate of singles minus the rate of married) for our entire sample is 2.62 percentage points (p.p.),
which varies from a minimum of 1.41 p.p. to a maximum of 4.40 p.p.. For males, the average gap
is 3.78 p.p. (varies from 2.2 p.p. to 5.72 p.p.); for females, the average gap is 1.55 p.p. (min. at
−0.27 p.p., max. at 3.49 p.p.).
Some remarkable facts arise from observing the stocks in the above figures. While the gap is
stable throughout our sample for men, unemployment rates by marital status are very close for
women up to the early 1980s, time at which the marriage unemployment gap starts increasing
for this group. This initial alignment across marital states during the late 1970s and early 1980s,
coincides with the increase in female labor force participation of women.
In terms of cyclicality, Figure 2 hints at the presence of a negative relationship between the
marriage gap and aggregate business cycle conditions, since single unemployment seems to react
more strongly to downturns than married unemployment. This is depicted more clearly in Section
B of the appendix, Figure 11, where we show time series for the actual gap (unemployment rates of
singles minus those of married), for both genders. From the figure, it is clear that the gap increases
in times of recession (grey vertical bars) and that this effect is stronger for males.
In the next section, we uncover partially the sources for these phenomena, by relating stocks and
transition probabilities between labor market states for each demographic group. In doing so, we
can attribute the level of the gap (and to some extent, its variability) to the level (and variability)
of the underlying transitions. Below we show these transition probabilities for males and females,
using our adjusted sample.
Figure 3, shows transition probabilities between E, U and O for males, separated by marital
status, while Figure 4 does the same for females. Notation XY denotes the probability of going
from labor market state X ∈ {E,U,O} to state Y ∈ {E,U,O}.
The figure for males shows that married males have a higher attachment to the labor market,
since job separations, both to unemployment (EU) and inactivity (EO), are lower for them than
for singles. On the other hand, the married group has higher job finding rates (UE) out of un-
employment, while they tend to exit to inactivity from unemployment (UO) at lower rates than
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Figure 3: Labor market transitions for males (probability in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Transitions are
corrected for time aggregation bias and classification errors. Adjusted sample to control for observables. Series
smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession
dates.
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Figure 4: Labor market transitions for females (probability in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Transitions are
corrected for time aggregation bias and classification errors. Adjusted sample to control for observables. Series
smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession
dates.
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singles. In contrast, as seen in Figure 4, transition probabilities for females are consistent with the
idea that married women have lower attachment to the labor force: more specifically, transitions
EO and UO are higher for married females than for single females, which points to the fact that
married women are more likely to exit the labor force than singles, both from employment and
unemployment. In term of time trends, the job losing probability EU and the transition between
non participation and unemployment OU , display a slight downward trend, for both married and
singles. Related to the dramatic increase of employment among married women displayed in the
right panel of Figure 1, the employment to out of the labor force transition EO has a big drop in
the first part of our sample (late 1970s to early 1980s), reducing in almost half (from around 6%
to around 3%).
4 A Decomposition Exercise
To account for the marriage unemployment gap, we perform a similar decomposition exercise to the
one in Shimer (2012): If we assume that at each point in time, we are at a steady state equilibrium
between inflows and outflows from each considered state {E,U,O}, we can approximate the measure
of individuals in each of them (up to a common multiplicative factor) by solving the following linear
system of equations
E˜t (EUt + EOt) = U˜t UEt + O˜t OEt
U˜t (UEt + UOt) = E˜t EUt + O˜t OUt
O˜t (OEt +OUt) = E˜t EOt + U˜t UOt
where E˜t, U˜t and O˜t are theoretical stocks of employed, unemployed and inactive, respectively
during period t. As before, notation XYt denotes the transition probability between states X and
Y during the same period. The interpretation of these equations is straightforward. The left hand
side represents the outflow of individuals from states {E,U,O} respectively, during month t. The
right hand side accounts for the number of individuals transiting into those same states. These two
numbers must be the same, assuming stationary transition probabilities inside the month.
Notice that the equations above represent a system of linear equations. Thus, the theoretical
stocks can be represented as functions that depend only on transition probabilities. Moreover,
these stocks can be computed for any particular demographic group (married vs. singles, females
vs. males) using its related transitions.
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Next, we can construct theoretical unemployment rates u˜ ≡ U˜t/(E˜t + U˜t), using the solutions
to the system above plus our estimates for each transition probability from the previous section:
u˜t =
OEtEUt +OUt(EUt + EOt)
OEt(UOt + EUt) + UEt(OEt +OUt) +OUt(EUt + EOt)
(1)
Denote as u˜st the unemployment rate resulting from using Equation 1 and the transition prob-
abilities of the single group. As noted in Shimer (2012), the steady state equation is a very good
approximation to the actual rates: the correlation between u˜st and the actual rate is 0.99 for males
and 0.97 for females. Using the theoretical approximation we can also create counterfactual rates:
let u˜st (XZ) be the outcome of using Equation 1 and all the transitions for the single group, with
the exception of XZ, which we replace by that of the married group. For example, u˜st (UE) repre-
sents the counterfactual unemployment rate of singles, if they were subject to the same job finding
probability UE as their married counterparts. By comparing the actual unemployment rate of
the married group with each of the u˜st (XZ) counterfactual rates, we can assess how important
particular transitions are in shaping the marriage unemployment gap.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual unemployment rates (in percentage) for single males from 1976:1 to 2013:12. Grey bars
denote NBER recession dates.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual unemployment rates (in percentage) for single females from 1976:1 to 2013:12. Grey bars
denote NBER recession dates.
In Figure 5 we present the exercise for males and in Figure 6 we do the same for females. From
Equation 1, it is clear that each transition probability has a non-linear effect on the theoretical
unemployment construct, from which the counterfactual rates are derived. Overriding the difficulty
of obtaining straightforward conclusions from comparisons of transition probabilities alone (across
marital states), the set of graphs in Figure 5 and 6 give a summarized and visual test for the
relative importance of each transition probability in accounting for the marriage unemployment
gap: whenever in the figures, the dark dashed line (”Single C.F.”) approaches the continuous one
(”Data Married”), it is a sign that the associated transition probability is important in explaining
the difference between single and married unemployment rates. Obviously, this is a theoretical
exercise, which suffers from several drawbacks: it is an arbitrary measure, it depends on the
accuracy of the steady state approximation explained above and only focuses on averages of the
time series.
Figure 5 shows that single males experience a comparatively high unemployment rate because
of their relatively high job losing rate (EU) they face compared to their married counterparts.
Looking at all six subfigures, the counterfactual when EU is swapped from singles to married
males is the one which most closely approximates the unemployment of the married males. On the
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other hand, transitions OE and UO have the least amount of influence in explaining the gap, since
the counterfactual line is barely distinguishable from the original single unemployment rate.
As for females, the differences in all transition probabilities seem to account for differences in
married versus single unemployment rates, with the exception of the EO transition. However, note
that in this particular exercise, no counterfactual can explain the earlier part of the time series for
both unemployment rates, when singles and married females had similar rates.
To provide an objective and quantitative measure of the relative importance of each transition
probability in shaping the marriage unemployment gap, below we construct a statistic which is
similar to the R-squared from a standard least-squares linear regression. Following our notation
above, let ust and u
m
t be the observed unemployment rates of single and married individuals at time
t, respectively. Then, we define the contribution of transition XZ to the marriage unemployment
gap as follows:
Sgap(XZ) = 1−
∑t=T
t=t0
[u˜st (XZ)− umt ]2∑t=T
t=t0
[ust − umt ]2
(2)
where t0 and T denote the limits of our time series. The denominator in the right hand side of
Equation 2 is the total sum of squared differences between the unemployment rates of singles versus
married. The numerator on the other hand, takes into account the difference between empirical rates
for married and the single counterfactual unemployment rate, when transition XZ is exchanged.
Note that the statistic has a maximum value of one, and this occurs when
∑
[u˜st (XZ)− umt ]2 =∑
[ust − umt ]2, which means that when the counterfactual unemployment rate for singles is equal
to the actual (data) rate for married, our statistic Sgap is equal to one. On the other hand, the
statistic is not bounded below, since the sum of squared differences between u˜st (XZ) and u
m
t can
be bigger than the empirical square difference between ust and u
m
t .
Transition Males Females
EU 0.82 0.60
EO 0.34 -2.75
UE 0.42 0.38
UO -0.31 0.26
OE -0.00 0.28
OU 0.48 0.30
Table 1: Contribution of each separate transition probability to the marriage unemployment gap, for
males and females. Second and third columns are the value of the statistic Sgap(XZ) = 1 −∑t=T
t=t0
[u˜st (XZ)− umt ]2 /
∑t=T
t=t0
[ust − umt ]2, where XZ is the related transition probability (see main text for details).
Higher numbers imply a higher contribution to the gap.
11
In Table 1 we calculate the statistic across all transitions. Given the discussion in the previous
paragraph, we can rank the contributions of all transitions to the gap. Corroborating the conclu-
sions from the graphical exercise, the second column in the table attributes most of the marriage
unemployment gap for males to the job losing transition EU , with a statistic of 0.82, significantly
higher than any other transition (OU is second, with a value of 0.48). Notice that transitions UO
and OE are associated with a negative value, which is explained by the fact that the counterfactual
rates for singles when these transitions are considered are actually farther away from the marriage
unemployment rates from the data. This is confirmed if we observed the related subfigures in
Figure 3.
As mentioned earlier, no counterfactual rate (as seen in Figure 4) can replicate the gap for
females at the beginning of the sample, time at which the marriage unemployment gap is close
to zero. Thus, our statistic performs relatively worse for females, which is seen when comparing
the second and third columns in Table 1: on average, the positive values are lower than for males.
With that caveat in mind, we find that the job losing probability EU is (as with males) the most
important transition affecting the marriage unemployment gap, with a corresponding statistic of
0.60, followed by the job finding probability UE, with a value of 0.38. The main difference with
respect to males, is that transition probabilities in and out of the labor force have a big impact in
explaining the gap: transitions OU , OE and UO have associated coefficients of 0.30, 0.28 and 0.26
respectively (the latter two are associated with negative coefficients for the male sample)7.
5 Discussion
In this section we analyze the extent as to which our counterfactual exercise addresses facts discussed
in Section 3. We also compare the results of our counterfactual exercise to those in Shimer (2012),
in order to contextualize them in the related literature.
Trends in married female labor force. In Figure 4, the transition probability EO exhibits
a downward trend for married females, between the end of the 1970s and the mid 1990s, time at
which it stabilizes at a level higher than that for single females. This means that the chances of
married women dropping from the labor force have declined in time, but that they are still higher
7In Appendix E we perform robustness exercises for the female decomposition using two restricted time periods:
1980 to 2013 and 1985 to 2013. Both samples confirm our results. Moreover, for 1985 to 2013, the participation
margin for females becomes more relevant than in the exercise in the main text. In particular, the OU transition
becomes almost as important as the EU transition.
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than for single females. As seen in Figure 6 and Table 1, the counterfactual exercise related to
this particular transition probability (EO) produces poor results, specially for the beginning of
the sample. This observation shows the limitations of our exercise and leaves important questions
regarding trends in female labor force participation, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
Cyclicality of the gap. As noted in Section 3, the marriage unemployment gap is counter-
cyclical: it goes up during recessions. This cyclicality is stronger for males. From our counterfactual
exercises, we find that one of the main drivers of the gap is the job losing probability, EU . Consistent
with our results, we observe in Figure 12 of Appendix C that the observed gap in this transition
probability is counter-cyclical and stronger for males.
Differences with Shimer (2012). Our goal in this paper is to understand the determinants
of the marriage unemployment gap, which is a statement on the levels of unemployment rates.
Moreover, throughout this paper, we make statements on averages across the considered time series.
Our analysis diverges from that in Shimer (2012), who proposes a similar method to understand
cyclical variations: although similar counterfactual unemployment rates are created, these series
are detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter and regressed against the empirical rates, from which
ordinary least squares coefficients are reported (our counterpart, is Equation 2), thus, the exercise
in Shimer (2012) is inherently scale free.8
Gaps in different demographic subgroups. Some interesting patterns arise when we consider
the marriage unemployment gap across different demographic subgroups. In Figures 14 and 15 of
Appendix D, we compute the gap for different age and educational groups.9 For both males and
females, we find that the gap is more pronounced for 26 to 35 year old individuals without college
degrees. This hints at the type of mechanism at hand, in which individuals with less education and
before entering ”prime-age” working years, see a bigger difference between the ones who are married
and those who are single. Again, the development of theories and/or structural explanations for
this fact are beyond the scope of our paper, but show interesting avenues for future research.
Composition of the EU transition. Our analysis shows that the difference between the EU
transitions of married and single individuals is the main determinant of the marriage unemploy-
ment gap. In Section F of the Appendix, we use the information in the CPS on the reason for job
8Further discrepancies between our paper and Shimer (2012) are in the treatment of the data: Shimer considers
time aggregation bias only when considering all transition probabilities (between E, U and O), while we also control
for misclassification errors and sample composition.
9We define the college group as those individuals that at least obtained a college degree.
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separation to compute the share of individuals in the EU transition who report a layoff, a quit, or
another reason (we do this by sex and marital status). We find no significant differences between
single and married individuals related to the reason of job separation. This finding suggests that
the difference in the EU transition between married and single individuals (and, hence, the mar-
riage unemployment gap) is unlikely to be generated by employer discrimination on unobservable
characteristics revealed during the employment spell.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we document different patters regarding worker flows and unemployment rates between
married and non-married individuals in the U.S. economy. Using monthly CPS data from 1976 to
2013, we show that the unemployment rate of married individuals is systematically lower than
for singles, both for males and females. This difference is persistent over time despite the notable
changes in the composition of the U.S. labor market: the increase of female labor force participation,
the convergence between the participation rate of single and married females and the slight decrease
of male worker’s participation.
We use monthly transitions across labor market states to perform a decomposition exercise that
allows us to identify the main channels driving the different unemployment rates between singles
and married. We find that for males, the higher employment exit probabilities exhibited by singles
are the main determinant of the gap. For females, we find that the participation margin also plays
a fundamental role.
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Appendix
A Figures of Non-adjusted data
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Figure 7: Employment rate by marital status (in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Series smoothed using a
12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
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Figure 8: Unemployment rate by marital status (in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Series smoothed using a
12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
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Figure 9: Labor market transitions for males (probability in percentage). CPS 1976:2-2013:12. Corrected for time
aggregation bias. Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars
denote NBER recession dates.
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Figure 10: Labor market transitions for females (probability in percentage). CPS 1976:2-2013:12. Corrected for
time aggregation bias. Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey
bars denote NBER recession dates.
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B Our Method of Controlling for Observables vs. Marginal Effects Probit
In this section we compare our method to control for observables and the results from a Probit
regression. Figure 11 compares the difference between the unemployment rate of single and married
individuals in our adjusted sample with the marginal effect of being single in the following Probit
model:10
Pr(U = 1 | ~X ′) = Φ(β0 × single+ ~β1 × ~X) (3)
where U is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual is unemployed and 0 otherwise,
single is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual is not married and 0 otherwise, the
vector ~X is the set of observable characteristics we use in the construction of our adjusted sample,
and Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function of the standard normal distribution.11 We estimate
the probit model by maximum likelihood.
In the adjusted sample, both married and single individuals present the same observable char-
acteristics. Hence, the difference between the unemployment rate of single and married individuals
reflects the different probabilities of being unemployed conditional on observables. This is equiv-
alent to estimating the Probit model in Equation 3 and computing the marginal effect of being
single (or married) controlling for observables. These results indicate that, both the exact matching
method we use to control for the effects of observables and using a Probit model to clean out the
effects of observables, deliver similar results. We choose to use exact matching because it does
not require to assume a particular parametric relationship between observables and labor market
outcomes.
10See Section 2 for a complete description of the procedure for constructing the adjusted sample.
11 ~X ′ = single + ~X.
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Figure 11: Unemployment rate. CPS 1976:1-2013:12. The solid line (Artificial Sample) represents the difference
between the unemployment rate of single and married individuals in our adjusted sample (in percentage points). The
dashed line (Marginal Effects) is the marginal effect (probability in percentage) of being single computed from the
estimation of the Probit model in Equation 3. Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals
aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
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C Gaps in transitions
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Figure 12: Labor market transitions for males (probability in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Corrected for time
aggregation bias and classification error. Adjusted sample to control for observables (see main text). Series smoothed
using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
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Figure 13: Labor market transitions gaps for females (probability in percentage). CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Corrected
for time aggregation bias and classification error. Adjusted sample to control for observables (see main text). Series
smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession
dates.
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Figure 14: Unemployment rate (in percentage) by subgroup, males. CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Adjusted sample to
control for observables (see main text). Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16
or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
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Figure 15: Unemployment rate (in percentage) by subgroup, females. CPS 1976:1-2013:12. Adjusted sample to
control for observables (see main text). Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16
or more. Grey bars denote NBER recession dates.
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E Decomposition Exercise for Females from 1985
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Figure 16: Counterfactual unemployment rates (in percentage) for single females, aged 16+, from 1980:1 to 2013:12.
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Figure 17: Counterfactual unemployment rates (in percentage) for single females, aged 16+, from 1985:1 to 2013:12.
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Transition 1980 onwards 1985 onwards All sample
EU 0.74 0.79 0.60
EO -2.87 -2.22 -2.75
UE 0.40 0.40 0.38
UO 0.41 0.47 0.26
OE 0.36 0.40 0.28
OU 0.56 0.71 0.30
Table 2: Contribution of each separate transition probability to the marriage unemployment gap, females. Second,
third, and forth columns are the value of the statistic Sgap(XZ) = 1 −∑t=Tt=t0 [u˜st (XZ)− umt ]2 /∑t=Tt=t0 [ust − umt ]2,
where XZ is the related transition probability (see main text for details). Higher numbers imply a higher contribution
to the gap.
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F Composition of the EU transition
We use the CPS information on the reason of job separation to compute the share of individuals
in the EU transition that report layoff, quit, or other as the reason for their job separation.
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Figure 18: Share of individuals in EU transition by reported job separation reason (in percentage). CPS 1976:1-
2013:12. Series smoothed using a 12-month moving average. All individuals aged 16 or more. Grey bars denote
NBER recession dates.
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